Published work
Why Do Democracies Accept More or Less Foreign Direct Investment? A Meta-Regression Analysis (with Quan Li and Erica Owen). International Studies Quarterly. 62(3), pp.494-504. In this manuscript, we test the mechanisms by which democracy is associated with foreign direct investment. We use the findings from 40 existing studies as a our dataset. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy014
Institutional Development and the Dowry Death Curve Across States in India (with Suparna Soni). Accepted for publication at the Journal of International Development. Scholars find that the practice of dowry is increasing in India despite increasing incomes and improvements to gender inequality. We argue that in low economic development situations males' families are able to realize the gains in income which reinforces gender inequality. But, in higher developed settings, males families are less able to demand dowries because gendered informal institutions are weaker. Data and replication files.
Under review
Fiscal Origins of Elections in Modern Dictatorships. When does a dictator introduce multiparty elections to secure the regime? I argue that dictators introduce elections when they have spent on repressive capacity sufficiently to survive elections but lack the additional budget capacity to buy-off the opposition. The results suggest the conditions for elections in contemporary dictatorships are analogous to those for the emergence of early and late modern parliaments and council assemblies.
The Electoral Authoritarian Advantage in Access to Credit: Historical Mechanisms in Modern Dictatorships. Authoritarian rulers in early and late modern Europe who struggled to meet their budgetary demands created representative institutions to broaden their support coalitions and stabilize their regimes. I argue that contemporary dictators introduce elections for similar reasons. The results suggest that the logic and substantive basis for authoritarian rulers to create representative institutions are general to both historical parliamentary regimes and contemporary electoral authoritarian dictatorships.
The Growth Enhancing Benefits of Political Exclusion in Edo Japan (with Weiwen Yin). Fiscal decentralization can increase local economic growth but depends on the political centralization of the regime. Local leaders that were excluded from central government politics in Edo Japan had greater incentive to invest in their own domains rather than using their domains' resources for their personal political advancements. Over 250 years of the Tokugawa's rule created higher growth in domains led by politically excluded leaders compared to the regime's subordinates.
Why Do Democracies Accept More or Less Foreign Direct Investment? A Meta-Regression Analysis (with Quan Li and Erica Owen). International Studies Quarterly. 62(3), pp.494-504. In this manuscript, we test the mechanisms by which democracy is associated with foreign direct investment. We use the findings from 40 existing studies as a our dataset. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy014
Institutional Development and the Dowry Death Curve Across States in India (with Suparna Soni). Accepted for publication at the Journal of International Development. Scholars find that the practice of dowry is increasing in India despite increasing incomes and improvements to gender inequality. We argue that in low economic development situations males' families are able to realize the gains in income which reinforces gender inequality. But, in higher developed settings, males families are less able to demand dowries because gendered informal institutions are weaker. Data and replication files.
Under review
Fiscal Origins of Elections in Modern Dictatorships. When does a dictator introduce multiparty elections to secure the regime? I argue that dictators introduce elections when they have spent on repressive capacity sufficiently to survive elections but lack the additional budget capacity to buy-off the opposition. The results suggest the conditions for elections in contemporary dictatorships are analogous to those for the emergence of early and late modern parliaments and council assemblies.
The Electoral Authoritarian Advantage in Access to Credit: Historical Mechanisms in Modern Dictatorships. Authoritarian rulers in early and late modern Europe who struggled to meet their budgetary demands created representative institutions to broaden their support coalitions and stabilize their regimes. I argue that contemporary dictators introduce elections for similar reasons. The results suggest that the logic and substantive basis for authoritarian rulers to create representative institutions are general to both historical parliamentary regimes and contemporary electoral authoritarian dictatorships.
The Growth Enhancing Benefits of Political Exclusion in Edo Japan (with Weiwen Yin). Fiscal decentralization can increase local economic growth but depends on the political centralization of the regime. Local leaders that were excluded from central government politics in Edo Japan had greater incentive to invest in their own domains rather than using their domains' resources for their personal political advancements. Over 250 years of the Tokugawa's rule created higher growth in domains led by politically excluded leaders compared to the regime's subordinates.
